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1. Introduction
The article seeks to present an empirical-sci-
entific model of modern geography. It is a basic 
philosophical-methodological standard of geog-
raphy which defines it as an empirical science. 
It accommodates cognitive properties of geogra-
phy which describe and determine its scientific 
character.
Philosophical-methodological models of ge-
ography are fundamental elements of a meta-
scientific study of geography. They give the 
characteristics of those philosophical aspects of 
geography that are considered essential in terms 
of the philosophical assumptions adopted. Those 
assumptions derive from various philosophical 
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streams or trends that form philosophical orien-
tations of geography.
According to Maik (2007: 31), “The dispute 
over the right methodology of geography went 
on for the entire 20th century. Methodological 
discussions greatly contributed to the develop-
ment of our discipline [geography], especially 
in the second half of the 20th century. (...) When 
sketching the general methodological panorama 
of the research in this field, one can find that 
methodological progress did not involve a re-
placement of older research paradigms by new 
ones; rather, it was a result of an inflow of new 
philosophical-methodological solutions”.
The philosophical studies undertaken by ge-
ographers seeking to determine the cognitive 
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nature of geography focused on various direc-
tions or streams of philosophy as philosophical 
assumptions. In the 1960s there appeared vari-
ous philosophical-methodological orientations of 
geography. Thus, the choice of a concrete direc-
tion of philosophical meta-scientific study of ge-
ography determines its notional framework and 
principles of its philosophical orientation. In re-
flections on the philosophical foundations of ge-
ography several orientations were distinguished, 
including empiricism, positivism and neo-pos-
itivism, humanism, phenomenology, idealism, 
structuralism, Marxism and neo-Marxism, post-
modernism, and feminism (cf. Chojnicki 1985, 
2004; Cloke et al. 1991; Peet 1998; Fotheringham 
2006).
While I do not propose to discuss those orien-
tations in detail, let me emphasise that their role 
in the shaping of philosophical-methodological 
models of geography has been neither unequivo-
cal, nor uniform. The individual orientations 
do not determine the character of the models in 
a straightforward way. Some, like postmodern-
ism or feminism, do not work out philosophi-
cal-scientific models in the proper sense, i.e. as 
cognitive-scientific standards. Rather, they offer 
a world view – an opinion about the world con-
taining some philosophical-ideological elements 
only marginally connected with science.
Philosophical-methodological models of ge-
ography should be seen as including only those 
standards that define the nature of geographical 
inquiry and knowledge. Their assumptions are 
established on the ground of the philosophy of 
science, i.e. philosophical reflection concerning 
science and scientific cognition. On this basis two 
models of contemporary geography have been 
worked out: empirical-scientific and humanistic. 
They differ fundamentally. The empirical-scien-
tific model places geography among empirical 
sciences, which embrace both natural and socio-
economic disciplines, and concerns the research 
fields of physical and socio-economic geography. 
The humanistic model, in turn, rests on the philo-
sophical assumptions of the humanities and their 
cognitive conceptions. This largely restricts its 
area of study to human (socio-economic) geog-
raphy.
Unlike the above, doctrinal orientations, like 
Marxism and neo-Marxism, and ideological ones, 
like postmodernism and feminism, do not pro-
vide a philosophical basis for the construction of 
philosophical-methodological models of geogra-
phy. They focus on a radical transformation of so-
ciety, as in the case of Marxism and neo-Marxism, 
or on the rejection of research methods in favour 
of an approach to knowledge as an analysis of 
texts and a variety of discourses of equal validity, 
as postulated by postmodernism, or in favour of 
differentiating the cognitive and practical charac-
ter of geographical knowledge by the criterion of 
gender (feminism). What is characteristic of those 
orientations, mostly popular in American geog-
raphy and with reference to ‘human geography’, 
is the perception of various philosophical streams 
and conceptions as a source of a fundamental re-
construction of geography in opposition to the 
empirical approach.
It should be emphasised that the adoption of 
doctrinal and ideological orientations as philo-
sophical assumptions of geography means an 
epistemological break-up, i.e. a process of a radical 
transformation of the cognitive nature of geogra-
phy as a result of which it can no longer appear 
in the role of an empirical science. Therefore one 
should defend the conception of geography as 
an empirical science by demonstrating that its 
empirical-scientific model is the right and pro-
ductive basis offering an insight into its cogni-
tive character and the directions of its develop-
ment.
In the modern system of sciences, empirical 
sciences are taken to include natural sciences 
(physics, chemistry and biology, including the 
earth sciences), social sciences (economy, soci-
ology, political sciences, linguistics, cultural sci-
ences, and law) as well as cross-disciplines and 
mixtures (anthropology, ecology, psychology 
and geography) (cf. Bunge 1983). While empiri-
cal sciences were at first identified with natural 
ones, the conception has been extended to in-
clude those dealing with human beings and soci-
ety whose methodologies assumed an empirical 
character; this has been termed methodological 
naturalism. Thus, the notion of empirical sciences 
offers a broader framework for the study of re-
ality than that of natural sciences while preserv-
ing the specificity of natural and social sciences, 
largely determined by their subject matters and 
research problems.
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2. Philosophical-methodological 
foundations of the empirical-scientific 
model of geography
The empirical-scientific model of geography 
has formed under the influence of empiricism as 
a philosophical stream. This influence was not 
continuous and differed in its forms and inten-
sity in the course of development of geographical 
thought.
The effect of empiricism proclaiming the 
opinion that notions and knowledge rest on sen-
sory experience and observation could be found 
in 19th-century geography. Boven (1981), who 
traced the influence of empiricism on the concep-
tions of geography in the 19th century, demon-
strated that empiricist philosophy determined 
the path of understanding of geography as an 
empirical science. She ascribed an important 
role in this to Alexander von Humboldt and his 
conception of examining the whole of nature in 
a geographical approach (1981: 258–259). Empiri-
cist philosophy did not have a decisive effect on 
the formation of the empirical-scientific model of 
geography, but it made itself felt in a variety of 
versions as an opinion stressing the role of ob-
servation and the creation of an empirical base 
as a source of description in the geographical re-
search procedure.
It was only logical empiricism, also called neo-
positivism, that considerably influenced the for-
mation of the empirical-scientific model of geog-
raphy; it became the chief basis of philosophical 
and methodological analysis in science. Logi-
cal empiricism is considered the leading direc-
tion in the 20th-century philosophy of science 
(Kołakowski 1966; Czarnocka 1995; Chojnicki 
2000). Its effect was not doctrinal; it manifested it-
self primarily in the adoption of ‘scientificity cri-
teria’ grounded in it to define the methodological 
standard of geography.
It is believed that the first study to apply the as-
sumptions of logical empiricism (neo-positivism) 
was Schaefer’s (1953), who suggested regarding 
geography as a science formulating laws govern-
ing the spatial distribution of phenomena on the 
Earth’s surface, thus making their explanation 
possible (cf. Unwin 1992: 113). The fundamental 
work based on the methodological assumptions 
of logical empiricism (neo-positivism) is thought 
to be Harvey’s Explanation in geography (1969). 
As the title suggests, it focuses on the notion of 
explanation as the chief goal of scientific activ-
ity. The basic means of achieving this task are 
scientific laws, theories and explanation-oriented 
conceptual models. Those issues are discussed in 
terms of a formal analysis of the language of geo-
graphical knowledge, geometry and the theory of 
probability, and description methods of systems 
analysis. Harvey’s work can be treated as the first 
attempt to present an empirical-scientific model 
of geography. However, the philosophical-meth-
odological assumptions underlying Explanation 
in geography are not restricted to those of logical 
empiricism; they also include Popper’s (1965) 
conceptions of critical rationalism and deductiv-
ism. This manifests itself, among other things, in 
inductive reasoning being supplemented in the 
book with the deductive falsification method. It 
may also be emphasised here that claims about 
Popper’s views belonging to logical empiricism 
(made by some philosophising geographers) are 
wrong. As Wójcicki maintains (1991: 91), Popper 
was less a continuator of neo-positivism (logical 
empiricism) than its gravedigger. Later Harvey 
(1972) adopted the Marxist and the radical orien-
tations in his study of the nature of geography, 
which, however, does not invalidate the signifi-
cance of his contribution to the development of 
its empirical-scientific model.
In geographical inquiry, the conception of log-
ical empiricism found expression in a program-
matic recognition of inductive inference in mak-
ing generalisations with the help of quantitative, 
especially statistical, methods, since the methodo-
logical core of logical empiricism is the opinion of 
inductivism about the fundamental role of induc-
tive reasoning in formulating scientific laws and 
theories. According to Wilson (1972: 32), “The in-
ductive method involves theorizing from a mass 
of observations. In its most refined form, this is 
more or less coincident with statistical analysis”. 
This adoption of quantitative, especially statisti-
cal, methods, or the co-called quantitative revo-
lution in geographical research, manifested itself 
mainly in spatial analysis concentrating largely 
on the examination of spatial structures and 
processes (cf. Berry & Marble 1968; Chojnicki & 
Marble 1973). With reference to socio-economic 
(human) geography, this approach was termed 
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‘spatial science’, although this conception was 
not kept up (cf. Cloke et al. 1991).
Logical empiricism aroused widespread criti-
cism, both internal and external. Internal criticism 
focused on the one-sidedness of the statistical-in-
ductive approach and its poor contribution to the 
process of formation of the theoretical aspect of 
geography. It is worth noting, however, that both 
the quantification of geographical knowledge 
and its theorisation were not closed processes 
and drew from a number of new post-positivistic 
conceptions put forward in the philosophy of 
empirical sciences.
External criticism concentrated on question-
ing, or even rejecting, the conception of geography 
as an empirical science. First of all, the opinion 
identifying the neo-positivistic orientation with 
the foundations of the philosophy and methodol-
ogy of science should be rejected. This opinion 
was and is a result of a superficial acquaintance 
with the modern philosophy of science. Today’s 
empirical-scientific model of geography does not 
rely on the assumptions of logical empiricism. 
Logical empiricism, despite its substantial contri-
bution to the philosophy of science – the working 
out of a conceptual apparatus of the methodol-
ogy of sciences and the introduction of logical 
analysis, a new style of practising the philosophy 
of science – is a historically closed orientation. 
The present-day character of science eludes the 
assumptions and theses of logical empiricism, 
and the modern philosophy of science cannot be 
identified with logical empiricism, which is only 
a fragment of its development.
Since the 1970s, the external criticism of neo-
positivistic orientations has been accompanied 
by efforts to reconstruct geography, especially 
its socio-economic (human) branch, within the 
framework of philosophical orientations formed 
outside the philosophy of science, mainly doctri-
nal-ideological ones, like Marxism, postmodern-
ism, and feminism.
Further development of the empirical-scien-
tific model of geography has gone far beyond 
the assumptions of logical empiricism. Today its 
philosophical-methodological foundations are 
thought to be various post-positivistic assumptions 
of the philosophy of science proper to analysis in 
empirical sciences. This approach, which can also 
be called critical-empirical, displays a kind of 
philosophical-methodological pluralism which 
consists in making use of some streams of the 
philosophy of science, like Popper’s critical ra-
tionalism and hypothetism, Lakatos’ methodol-
ogy of research programmes, Kuhn’s paradigms, 
transcendental realism, and other (cf. Bird 1993).
It would be hard to give even an outline of the 
notions and principles of those streams that are 
components of the modern philosophy of science 
(cf. Chojnicki 2000). Efforts to employ their con-
ceptions to determine the philosophical-meth-
odological nature of geography have failed to 
produce its reasonably uniform characterisation 
as an empirical science. They are a source of con-
ceptual principles and categories which underlie 
models of empirical sciences.
What I assume to be the foundations of the 
empirical-scientific model of geography are 
largely the principles and notions of scientific 
philosophy as a philosophical orientation, and on 
this basis I seek to determine its integrated model 
(Chojnicki 2004: 199). Scientific philosophy ap-
proaches the modern philosophy of science as 
a whole, which allows grasping and presenting 
the cognitive character of empirical sciences in 
a relatively consistent way. Within its conceptual 
framework it was possible to concretise the as-
sumptions and conceptual categories of the em-
pirical-scientific model of geography.
A conception of scientific philosophy and its 
synthesis was formulated and worked out by 
Mario Bunge in his Treatise on basic philosophy 
(volumes I-VIII, 1974–1989). In a different ap-
proach it was also presented by Grzegorczyk 
(1993). It can be characterised succinctly as fol-
lows: “Scientific philosophy is closely connected 
with scientific knowledge. And while it provides 
a basis for the philosophical inquiry into sci-
ence, it has a scientific character itself, because it 
meets the criteria proper to scientific knowledge 
and must be consistent with it. (...) Thus, scien-
tific philosophy does not obey its meta-scientific 
character and does not dominate over science. 
This requires the use of some formal logical tools 
of the theory of logical syntax and semantics, as 
well as the theory of definitions and inferences. 
However, chief emphasis is put here on making 
notions precise, on argumentation and justifi-
cation, rather than on a formal logical analysis 
of the scientific character of knowledge and its 
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axiomatic-deductive structure. Such an analysis 
is a necessary but not predominant (...) element 
of a study of science” (Chojnicki 2004: 200). The 
subject matter of scientific philosophy embraces 
both, methodological assumptions as well as on-
tological and epistemological ones. According to 
Bunge (1983: 204), “There is no science without 
some ontology and some epistemology. To be-
gin with, all the fundamental concepts of science, 
such as those of thing and property, state and 
change of state, possibility and actuality, space 
and time, life and mind, artifact and society, are 
ontological. Secondly, when exploring some un-
chartered territory, a scientist is tacitly guided 
by a number of ontological and epistemological 
principles. For one thing, he presupposes that the 
most general known laws hold in the new terri-
tory, and that the most general methodological 
principles will help him to explore it. (...) If he 
believes in objective possibility, he will investi-
gate things-in-their-environment instead of try-
ing to account for their behavior exclusively in 
terms of environmental agencies. If he believes in 
randomness, he will try stochastic models, other-
wise he will limit himself to deterministic ones. If 
he is an inductivist, he will collect as many facts 
as possible before hazarding any hypotheses. If 
he is a deductivist, he will prefer exploring the 
logical consequences of hypotheses presupposed 
by others.”
The empirical-scientific model of geography 
and its character as an empirical science is not an 
object of much interest and philosophical reflec-
tion today. This is due, on the one hand, to the ni-
hilistic criticism of the usefulness of conceptions 
of the philosophy of science in the meta-scientific 
study of geography, and on the other, attempts 
to employ humanistic and ideological-radical 
orientations to reconstruct geography, especially 
socio-economic (human) geography.
3. Philosophical-methodological 
characteristics of the empirical-
scientific model of geography
The empirical-scientific model of geography 
defines its properties as an empirical science. Its 
characterisation in terms of assumptions of sci-
entific philosophy embraces three main problem 
areas: ontological, epistemological and methodo-
logical.
Ontological problems involve the substantive 
structure of ‘the world of geography’, or the frag-
ment of reality it addresses in its research. Epis-
temological problems deal with the cognitive 
nature of geographical inquiry. Methodological 
problems include the research procedure and 
activities (methods) as well as the structure and 
function of geographical knowledge. The charac-
terisation of each problem area of the empirical-
scientific model of geography contains theses 
that are concretisations of the basic principles 
and notions of the philosophy of science and that 
present specific philosophical-methodological 
properties of geography as an empirical science.
3.1. Ontological problems
According to Benton & Craib (2001: 5), “Each 
discipline has its own regional ontology, its own 
way of listing, describing and classifying the 
range of things, relations or processes it deals 
with; this is the range of things which it claims to 
give us knowledge of.”
Ontological problems of geography involve 
primarily the definition of its subject matter. 
Within the framework of scientific philosophy, 
this can best be done on the ground of ontological 
realism, which presupposes the existence of the 
world independently of the investigating mind. 
Ontological realism leads to the assumption 
(opinion) that the subject matter of empirical sci-
ences is their domain, which consists of objects of 
some kind, their properties, and relations hold-
ing among them. It is assumed that it determines 
the research scope of the given science and the 
subject matter of its inquiry.
The issue of the subject matter of geography 
and its scope is highly debatable and poorly root-
ed ontologically. The approach to it presented 
here is a modification of an earlier one (Chojnicki 
2005). In the empirical-scientific model, the prob-
lem of the domain of geography looks as follows.
In sciences in which knowledge has a theoreti-
cal character and takes the form of basic theories, 
the domain of a given discipline is defined by the 
subject-matter models those theories comprise. 
Subject-matter models contain conceptual con-
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structs of objects and relations examined by those 
theories and their research assumptions. Hence, 
the development or creation of new basic theo-
ries changes their domain. Owing to the absence 
of basic theories in the structure of geographical 
knowledge, subject-matter models defining the 
domain of geography are contained in separate 
pre-theories. The models in those pre-theories 
denote objects and their properties or relations 
that are the subject matter of geographical in-
quiry. Among the major pre-theories one can list 
the systems, chorological, landscape, environ-
mental, interactive, and regional ones. Their con-
tent and problems have not been given uniform 
definitions, so they occur in a variety of versions 
(cf. Maik et al. 2005).
Without going into the details of those pre-the-
ories, let me mention that the one worth special 
attention among them is the systems approach. 
It allows perceiving the domain of geography as 
a variety or concretisation of the notion of a real 
system, which is a basic ontological category. In 
‘systems philosophy’ reality is a highly complex 
“world of systems” (cf. Bunge 1977). A substan-
tive interpretation of the systems approach in ge-
ography was first given by Chorley (1962), and 
then by Haggett (1965) and Chapman (1977), who 
laid the foundations for a systems pre-theory. It 
offers a conceptual framework for a wide spec-
trum of systemic subject-matter models of basic 
significance for determining the subject matter 
and research field of geography with reference to 
its empirical-scientific model.
The pre-theories can be treated as competi-
tive subject-matter hypotheses giving geography 
a different character and scope, i.e. defining its 
research field in various ways. Their competitive-
ness can be assessed with the help of criteria de-
termining (1) the field of the empirical research of 
geography and its research procedure, and (2) its 
growth potential. By the first criterion, the most 
constructive cognitively will be that of the pre-
theories which defines its research field in the 
broadest way possible. The adoption of the other 
criterion gives preference to those pre-theories 
that offer greater opportunities for innovation 
and development in research methods and for 
the examination of new aspects of reality.
The division of geography into two basic sub-
disciplines: physical (natural) and socio-econom-
ic (human), highlights their subject-matter dif-
ferences, i.e. it reflects differences that occur in 
the spheres of reality they investigate – nature 
and society – and differences in the regularities 
that underlie them. The recognition of their deep 
separateness shifts the issue of the subject matter 
of geography from a monistic to a dualistic per-
spective that this division presupposes (cf. Maik 
2004).
In connection with the division, there can be 
various ways of approaching the subject mat-
ter of the two sub-disciplines. One involves the 
adoption of a pre-theory, common to both, which 
fulfils strong criteria determining and explain-
ing their substantive scopes. For example, the 
systems approach can be a common substantive 
basis for both physical and socio-economic geog-
raphy. Another approach consists in working out 
separate pre-theories in physical and economic 
geography which would describe their respective 
fields of inquiry. The subject-matter approach to 
geography is criticised. According to Lisowski 
(2007: 46), there is a growing doubt about the 
classical conceptions of what constitutes the ge-
ographical subject matter which mostly springs 
from the criticism of the chorological conception.
The approach to this issue changes completely 
when the focus shifts from the subject matter of 
geography to its research problems, i.e. priority 
is given to problems over the substantive scope. 
This is the opinion presented by Perzanowski 
(1989: 232), who claims that “with a focus on re-
search problems, attention is paid to what is in-
vestigated and the choice of notions is made an 
instrument, while talking of a domain leads to 
a confusion as to what is investigated and what 
results are expected. Concentrating on research 
problems enduring and evolving over time offers 
a fuller insight into the history and continuity of 
the domain than a description of its objects and 
notions”.
Still, I believe that the substantive scope of ge-
ography is determined by mutual relations hold-
ing between its domain and its research problems. 
The scope of geography, as of any science, is not 
a ‘ready-made good’, and difficulties involved in 
determining it are not specific to geography; they 
are widely found especially in social sciences. 
Thus, the conception of the empirical-scientific 
model by itself does not settle the question of the 
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substantive nature of geography. Its framework 
allows a variety of approaches to the domain 
of geography, though always closely connected 
with its subject matter and research field (Choj-
nicki 2007: 21).
3.2. Epistemological problems
Epistemological problems are those con-
cerning the cognitive character of geographical 
knowledge. I shall restrict my analysis to two 
issues involving geographical knowledge and 
standpoints proper to its empirical-scientific 
model: 1) the adequacy of this knowledge, and 2) 
its sources. It is worth noting that an analysis of 
those issues is closely connected with methodo-
logical problems.
The standpoint I adopt as a basis for charac-
terising the adequacy of geographical knowledge 
is that of critical, or cognitive, realism. In princi-
ple, apart from the view that reality is cognosci-
ble with the help of notions, it assumes that this 
cognition seeks to find the truth, i.e. to formulate 
truthful statements. While I shall not discuss the 
various conceptions of truth, especially its classi-
cal definition, let me quote what Wójcicki (1991: 
1) has to say on this matter: “If we assert that our 
knowledge or some part of it concerns an inde-
pendent reality, we claim something that can be 
expressed as follows. Reality, or at least those of 
its fragments that can be objects of our cognition, 
is endowed with a structure: it consists of some 
kinds of objects possessing some characteristics 
and connected by some relations. We are able – 
and this in fact is the task of science – to grasp 
this structure of reality correctly and, by working 
out a suitable conceptual apparatus, to give its 
description that will be true in the literal sense”.
Let me emphasise that this is what fundamen-
tally differentiates this model from doctrinal phil-
osophical conceptions: neo-Marxism, idealism, 
and especially postmodernism, which generally 
adopt an anti-realistic position and preach instru-
mentalism, or the opinion that “there is no one 
true way of viewing the world” (Wójcicki 1991: 
2). Cognitive realism seems to be an essential el-
ement of the scientific status of geography. The 
defence of realism has not been given much atten-
tion in the philosophical-methodological analysis 
of geography, and the problem itself gained some 
significance with the appearance of co-called tran-
scendental realism (cf. Bhaskar 1975; Sayer 1985). 
Transcendental realism is a philosophical-meth-
odological stream based on assumptions which, 
when applied to the cognitive foundations of 
geography (mostly its socio-economic sub-disci-
pline), are in opposition to the empirical-scientific 
model owing to their anti-empirical nature (cf. 
Cloke et al. 1991; Chojnicki 2000: 67).
As to the sources of geographical knowledge, 
it should be emphasised that the empirical-scien-
tific model involves rejecting the thesis – initially 
accepted in geography – about preference for an 
empirical base of geographical knowledge. An 
empirical base, which is a set of observational 
statements derived from objectivised percep-
tions, is to be an independent and basic source 
as well as a component in the building up of geo-
graphical knowledge. The preference means that 
observational statements are supposed to guar-
antee their own truthfulness or falsehood, so that 
there is no need for non-observational, theoretical 
statements to do this (cf. Gregory 1978: 55; Choj-
nicki 1985: 5). The consequence is a distrust of 
theories and resistance against theory building. 
Equal epistemological validity of observational 
and theoretical statements, or an elimination of 
this division, is a crucial condition of the devel-
opment of geography.
3.3. Methodological problems
Methodological problems are at the core of 
the empirical-scientific model of geography. It 
employs the full, wide apparatus of methodo-
logical assumptions and notions of the modern 
philosophy of science. This makes possible both, 
a methodological reconstruction of geography 
and the presentation of significant programmatic 
postulates intended to give it the characteristics 
of an empirical science. Because of the vastness 
and differences in the interpretation of this mat-
ter, I shall limit myself to the presentation of the 
chief methodological issues of geography specific 
to this model. They include:
a) theorisation of geographical knowledge,
b) establishment of facts as a basis of the empiri-
cal nature of geographical knowledge,
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c) symbiosis of inductive and deductive proce-
dures,
d) complementarity of quantitative and qualita-
tive approaches,
e) share of axiological statements in geographi-
cal knowledge and inquiry,
f) recognition of explanation and forecasting as 
the main cognitive functions of geography, 
and
g) growing importance of the practical function 
of geographical knowledge.
3.3.1. Theorisation of geographical 
knowledge
There is a fairly widespread opinion that geog-
raphy does not possess a developed body of the-
oretical knowledge. This gives it a pre-theoretical 
character and limits its potential for explanation 
and forecasting. Empirical theories are generally 
identified with a collection of theoretical (non-ob-
servational) statements, especially scientific laws, 
related and arranged logically and thematically 
and justified empirically, which refer to a do-
main. In the formal logical approach represent-
ed by logical empiricism, scientific theories are 
termed axiomatic-deductive systems. Elements 
constituting those theories are built using logical 
means and form deductively closed sets of state-
ments.
Because of difficulties with the formalisation 
of statements at a low level of abstraction, at-
tempts to build theories in geography in the form 
of axiomatic-deductive systems produced results 
that were trivial in cognitive terms (cf. Amadeo & 
Golledge 1975). This also concerns social and bio-
logical sciences in which, within the post-positiv-
istic model, more liberal methodological stand-
ards of theory were adopted that abandoned the 
principle of its structural-logical formalisation 
(cf. Bunge 1996).
Thus, further advances in the theorisation of 
geographical knowledge require some re-think-
ing of the conception of theory accommodating 
the specific subject matter and research prob-
lems of geography. This, of course, is a task far 
exceeding the scope of this paper. Still, there are 
a few associated issues worth considering. I shall 
restrict myself to two: (1) the ‘liberal’ methodo-
logical standard of theory, and (2) cognitive func-
tions of theory in geography.
Re 1. The liberal methodological standard of 
theory in geography contains the following con-
ditions: 
Theories include not only scientific laws, but  –
also general statements which are supposed 
to serve, or which do serve, as premises for 
explaining, anticipating or forecasting empiri-
cal facts. Because of difficulties involved in the 
formulation of scientific laws, theories are to 
contain descriptions of regularities underly-
ing the structures or mechanisms that gov-
ern the studied phenomena, as well as social 
trends and rules. As Wójcicki (1991: 13) states, 
“theories appear when we manage to grasp, 
at least in a preliminary way, at least in a very 
general outline, the structure or mechanism 
(...) of a class of phenomena”.
The substantive reference of a theory (i.e. the  –
fragment of reality that the theory addresses) 
should display a measure of conceptual con-
sistence (real systems, events and processes), 
i.e. should offer a good conceptual outline of 
the whole. It can be presented in the form of 
subject-matter models, i.e. idealised images of 
fragments of reality concentrating on some of 
their properties, usually significant ones.
The logical links among statements belong- –
ing to a theory should ensure it coherence and 
consistence based on logical or mathematical 
proof. Mathematical instruments need not be 
highly refined and can be restricted to math-
ematical statistics.
The empirical justification of a theory rests  –
on facts derived from its field. Its individual 
components should not be justified and veri-
fied empirically independently of one another 
because of the integral nature of the theory.
In principle, it is assumed that theories are  –
universal in nature. However, since geo-
graphical studies concern the spatial hetero-
geneity of the world, there arises the prob-
lem of a local or regional character of some 
geographical theories. Both the substantive 
reference of the examined phenomena, espe-
cially systems (e.g. geocomplexes, territorial 
systems), and various mechanisms and regu-
larities have a geographically limited spatial 
(or spatial-temporal) range, which often gives 
their theoretical examination a local character. 
This is a highly controversial problem requir-
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ing careful consideration, the more so as the 
notion of universality itself can be understood 
in relative terms.
Re 2. Theories in geography perform two 
kinds of function: autonomous and instrumen-
tal. Autonomous functions concern the role that 
theories play in the research process. Three issues 
are involved:
Theories codify and systematise the existing  –
body of knowledge, reveal connections be-
tween its fragments and gaps in the current 
image of the world, and enhance the accumu-
lation of research results.
Theories facilitate an empirical verification of  –
knowledge because they make it possible to 
test some statements indirectly, through their 
links with previously tested statements.
Theories are a factor initiating further research  –
by posing new problems and indicating new 
research directions.
The instrumental function appears when the 
role of a theory goes beyond the framework of 
the research process, namely when it performs an 
explanatory and a prognostic function, and indi-
rectly a practical function.
In the theoretical development of geography, 
at an earlier stage of theory building the chief role 
was played by autonomous functions. However, 
of fundamental importance in the theorisation 
of geographical knowledge is the construction 
of theories performing instrumental functions 
because they lay down the basic cognitive aim 
of scientific knowledge. Theories in geography 
have not got a uniform character, hence they 
display a variety of approaches which fulfil the 
conditions of theory building to a greater or less-
er extent and which perform various cognitive 
and/or practical functions. This issue, however, 
would need to be explored in more depth.
3.3.2. Establishment of facts as a foundation 
of the empirical nature of geographical 
knowledge
Empirical facts are of fundamental impor-
tance in building up geographical knowledge. In 
a broad understanding, facts are states of things 
or changes in those states (cf. Bunge 2006: 17). 
According to Wójcicki (1995: 162), “Facts are not 
identical with any sentences. (...) They are what 
we reach as a result of suitable empirical activi-
ties, like observation in the simplest case, and 
what we strive to convey using sentences”. Facts 
can be both, single states of things (individual 
events or processes) and regularities (empirical 
laws of a limited temporal-spatial range).
In geographical inquiry the basic cognitive 
practice (method) for ascertaining empirical facts 
is observation. It is a research procedure seeking 
to establish a state of things or its change, i.e. an 
empirical fact, either directly, on the basis of ob-
servations made, or indirectly, using instruments 
or information obtained from respondents in the 
form of interviews and questionnaires. However, 
establishing facts is not autonomous because it 
always rests on some theoretical presuppositions. 
Establishing empirical facts is determined by the 
process of the objectivisation of results that oc-
curs in the course of observation, which involves 
various aspects of the research procedure, and 
generally the researcher’s competence in making 
the observation. In geography this primarily con-
cerns fieldwork. It must be strongly emphasised 
that especially in fieldwork much weight should 
be attached to the researcher’s well-developed 
competence and practical skills in employing the 
right diagnostic techniques, both in direct and in-
direct observations.
Today the establishment of empirical facts 
is extended to include experimental simulation 
studies, especially digital simulation modelling. 
It leads to an expansion of the substantive scope 
and research problems of geography in both its 
natural and socio-economic sub-disciplines, and 
improves the accuracy of the results obtained, the 
set of which provides the empirical basis of geo-
graphical knowledge. 
The new tools and methods expanding the 
empirical base of geographical knowledge in-
clude aerial photography, satellite-borne remote 
sensing, the Global Positioning System, and the 
Geographic Information System (Ciołkosz 2007). 
They are the basis and instruments of the infor-
matisation of geographical knowledge. Informa-
tisation is understood as a rational use of data 
stored in instrumental systems which involves 
not only the processing of those data, but also 
their ‘production’ in some generalised forms. 
This definition does not exhaust the full semantic 
content of the term, but aptly describes the char-
acter and role of GIS, which is not only a set of 
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operators and research techniques, but also a re-
search method going beyond the building of an 
empirical base.
From a methodological point of view, an es-
pecially interesting issue is how GIS changes 
the character of geographical knowledge and 
its functions. Some geographers, e.g. Widacki 
(2004: 164 ff.), see GIS as an instrument of a radi-
cal reconstruction of the nature and functions of 
geography. Even if one does not share this opin-
ion, one must admit that GIS is a new, important 
instrumental-conceptual component of the build-
ing of geographical knowledge.
In conclusion, it should be emphasised that 
factual knowledge should not be interpreted as 
purely descriptive because it is also a fundamen-
tal component of theoretical knowledge which 
decides about its adequacy. Wójcicki (1995: 164) 
even claims that “a discipline (...) is a science if 
there is a sufficiently broad consensus among its 
representatives as to what is a fact in this disci-
pline, and how the facts established in this disci-
pline decide about the accuracy or otherwise of 
theoretical generalisations”.
3.3.3. Symbiosis of inductive and deductive 
procedures
The acquisition of geographical knowledge 
of a high degree of generalisation is the chief 
postulate for giving geography the character of 
an empirical science. In empirical sciences there 
are two pathways for achieving this goal: induc-
tive and deductive. Inductive reasoning was 
rooted in studies focusing on the description of 
individual objects and events or their spatially-
temporally closed sets. Also the results of those 
concretising studies, called idiographic, could be 
a basis of generalisation by induction. However, 
the inductive pathway did not prove to be espe-
cially effective, either in discovering regularities 
or in theory building. Critics of this procedure 
pointed out that a much more efficient way of 
building up knowledge of a general type in the-
oretically advanced empirical sciences was the 
so-called deductive method. It involves testing 
hypotheses through empirical facts (test impli-
cations) with the use of confirmatory or falsify-
ing procedures. The latter were considered by 
Popper (1965) to be logically efficient methods 
of verification.
It seems that geography with its attachment 
to factual knowledge can and should combine 
both procedures. Inductive generalisation is of-
ten the crowning of a descriptive research, and 
its efficiency increases with the use of methods of 
statistical inference and multivariate analysis. In 
turn, the use of mathematical modelling methods 
has opened the way to, and then reinforced, the 
deductive approach.
3.3.4. Complementarity of quantitative and 
qualitative approaches
The complementarity of quantitative and 
qualitative approaches is a significant aspect of 
geographical inquiry in the empirical-scientific 
model. At first no attention was paid in methodo-
logical considerations to the distinction between 
quantitative and qualitative aspects of geograph-
ical research, in spite of a wide use of statistical 
description. Also, the very notion of a qualitative 
approach is not unequivocal and hard to define 
explicitly, if only because of the vagueness of 
the categories of quantity and quality with ref-
erence to measurement scales and conceptual in-
struments of analysis. Hence, it is not correct to 
present a qualitative approach as a field of study 
in which the notional apparatus employed is one 
devoid of numerical values (quantities). Also, 
a closer description of ‘qualitative research’ goes 
beyond the framework of the empirical approach 
(Denzin & Lincoln 1998).
A breakthrough in the development of quan-
titative studies in geography was the formulation 
and implementation of the programme of appli-
cation of mathematical statistics and mathemati-
cal models, which was termed a quantitative 
revolution (Burton 1963). Its result was a wide 
spectrum of applications of mathematics (includ-
ing statistical methods) which far exceeded the 
original scope of the programme.
The quantitative approach does not imply 
any separate section of geography in the form of 
‘quantitative geography’, although sometimes 
this term has been used. It is simply a set of sta-
tistical and mathematical methods employed in 
geographical research and in the building of geo-
graphical knowledge in the model and theoretical 
approaches (cf. Chojnicki & Wróbel 1961; Choj-
nicki 1971; Czyż 1973; Czyż & Ratajczak 1991). 
The present-day problems addressed in those 
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applications go far beyond spatial analysis. They 
embrace a broad range of mathematical notions 
and analyses also employed in other empirical 
sciences (cf. Ratajczak 1998).
However, in methodological solutions con-
cerning the research procedure, especially in 
socio-economic geography, the interest in math-
ematical methods has declined. This seems to be 
largely caused by the development of anti-empir-
ical orientations in geography as represented by 
the humanistic and ideological-radical approach-
es, i.e. by a departure from the understanding of 
geography as an empirical science (cf. Fother-
ingham 2006: 246). Still, despite the diminished 
methodological interest in mathematical-statisti-
cal methods, they have become fixed in research 
practice as an indispensable component of the re-
search procedure and the structure of geographi-
cal knowledge without which geography would 
loose its empirical science status. In geographical 
inquiry, both approaches – qualitative and quan-
titative – have an integral, and complementary, 
character (cf. Sechrest & Sidani 1995; Philip 1998). 
Research works regarded as qualitative usually 
also contain quantitative elements, if only in the 
form of quantitative information. The combina-
tion of the empirical approach to knowledge with 
the many-sided application of mathematics has 
brought about explosive development of empiri-
cal sciences. But one should better also remem-
ber Bunge’s (1985: 85) warning: “Mathematics is 
a good servant, but a bad master”.
3.3.5. Share of axiological statements in 
geographical knowledge and inquiry
In the empirical-scientific model of geogra-
phy, axiological statements, i.e. values and value 
judgements, are recognised as a significant com-
ponent of geographical knowledge and inquiry. 
This is due to the awareness of the character and 
role of those elements and their use in an evalu-
ative description of the objects, events and proc-
esses studied. To avoid a misunderstanding, let 
me explain that I do not mean the recently dis-
cussed ‘evaluation of geography’, nor a focus on 
moral-ethical attitudes towards the world (moral 
geography) like e.g. social justice, although the 
latter problems are in the field of interest of geog-
raphy in the humanistic approach. What I mean 
is the contribution of evaluative statements to the 
building of geographical knowledge. The neo-
positivistic approach eliminates this issue from 
the substantive field of geography, because it 
holds that such statements have not got a logical 
value. 
However, in their research practice geogra-
phers regularly use terms and statements eval-
uating both, some states of things and research 
practices themselves. From the philosophical-
methodological point of view, an important 
question is to realise the role and weight of value 
judgements and evaluation (in the axiological 
sense) in knowledge building and the research 
procedure. I believe this issue to be an important 
element of the empirical-scientific model. The 
argumentation for this standpoint is too vast to 
present in a few sentences, so let me just mention 
two questions: (1) the sharp division between em-
pirical facts and values preached by logical em-
piricism is not justified; and (2) several notions 
of geographical knowledge contain descriptive 
and evaluative expressions, e.g. capitalist econ-
omy, sustainable development, revitalisation, or 
climate warming, and to understand their sense 
one has to consider their evaluative load.
3.3.6. Explanation and forecasting: the main 
cognitive functions of geography
The notion of a function of scientific knowl-
edge is identified with the role it performs in the 
understanding and transformation of the world. 
The chief cognitive functions of geographical 
knowledge are explanation and forecasting. 
Geographical knowledge has also got practical 
functions, which are expressed in what it helps 
to achieve in the practical sphere of activity. 
Recognising explanation as a basic function of 
geographical knowledge is a critical element in 
defining the cognitive character of geography as 
an empirical science, because the explanation of 
facts and regularities is the primary goal, as well 
as a development factor, of scientific knowledge, 
especially theory (Harvey 1969). As van Fraassen 
put it (1980: 157), “the search for explanation is 
ipso facto a search for empirically adequate, em-
pirically strong theories.”
In principle, explanation is understood as an 
answer to the question “Why is it so?”, or the re-
lated “Why did the given fact occur?” and “What 
was the reason?” etc. A basic conception of expla-
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nation was presented by Hempel & Oppenheim 
(1948) in a so-called deductive-nomological mod-
el, later expanded by Hempel (1965) to include 
an inductive-statistical model. Thus, the crucial 
components of this model are scientific laws 
and theories as well as formal-logical inference. 
This conception attracted criticism because of its 
formal-logical nature and founding explanation 
on recognised scientific statements (cf. Woleński 
1996: 252). The model presupposes that the fact 
being explained (the statement about the fact) 
follows logically (deductively), or with a high de-
gree of probability, from explanatory premises, 
i.e. from scientific laws and initial conditions.
The difficulties involved in the application 
of structural-logical models in geography are 
caused not only by their functional limitations, 
but mainly also by poor development of nomo-
logical and theoretical knowledge. Hence a better 
basis for methodological explanation in geogra-
phy is the heuristic or the relationistic conception. 
In the former, explanation assumes the character 
of an insight and does not just come down to jus-
tification according to the nomological-deductive 
scheme. It involves putting forward hypotheses 
to account for facts. The place of ‘ready-made’ 
scientific laws and theories is taken by theoretical 
hypotheses about the processes or factors respon-
sible for the states of things presented in facts (cf. 
Mejbaum 1995: 128). On this reading, explana-
tion – or better, the explanatory procedure – is 
simultaneously a way of building the theoretical 
kind of knowledge.
In the relationistic approach, the premises for 
the explanation of facts present the mechanisms 
which determine, or are a condition of, specific 
states, or change of states, that are facts. In geo-
graphical inquiry, the notion of a mechanism it-
self is understood broadly: it embraces both, vari-
ous aspects (natural, socio-economic, ecological) 
and types of mechanism (causal, stochastic, inter-
active). Discovering those mechanisms and their 
theoretical description is a basis of explanation 
(cf. Bunge 1983; 1996: 138; Chojnicki 2002: 18 ff.). 
It should be noted that this conception is not only 
a programme, but also a report, as can be shown 
when analysing reflections on the explanation of 
facts offered in various geographical works.
Recognising forecasting as the chief cognitive 
function of geography besides explanation is 
connected with a great upsurge of interest in the 
future, also in the field of geographical inquiry 
(cf. Chojnicki 1970, 1977). Forecasting consists in 
anticipating future states of things or events. To 
forecast a state of things or an event is to give an 
answer to the question “What will it be like in 
the future?”, and in particular, “What will this 
future moment be like?”, “When will it be?”, etc. 
Answers to those question, or forecasts, should 
be limited to statements offering a rational-em-
pirical justification. In a narrower understanding, 
forecasts are statements about the occurrence in 
the future of a state or events referring to a speci-
fied moment or period of time whose truthful-
ness or falsehood is not known at the moment 
of their formulation (cf. Czerwiński 1975). On 
a broader reading, forecasts are statements with 
no temporal reference, which makes it practically 
impossible to assess their logical value.
Forecasting as a scientific procedure has to 
be based on rational foundations, and hence re-
quires a justification which can be theoretical or 
extra-theoretical. The theoretical justification of 
forecasts springing from geographical knowl-
edge is far from efficient owing to poor devel-
opment of theories in geography and their low 
prognostic power. There are greater possibilities 
in the building of mathematical models, espe-
cially digital simulation ones, which can accom-
modate the high complexity of the events and 
phenomena being forecast. The extra-theoretical 
justification of forecasts resorts to various statisti-
cal extrapolation methods, correlation and regres-
sion analysis, and the construction of time trends 
(cf. Haggett 1973). Progress in this research, es-
pecially concerning highly complex geographical 
phenomena, heavily relies on the new possibili-
ties offered by computer programs and informa-
tion science.
Forecasting in geography plays two impor-
tant functions: internal and external. The inter-
nal function involves the role of forecasts in the 
research process and consists in the empirical 
testing of theoretical knowledge, i.e. scientific 
laws and theories, through forecasts. Hence, it 
is a significant component of knowledge build-
ing with the help of hypothetical-deductive 
methods. The external or instrumental function, 
in turn, involves the role that efficient forecasts 
take on outside the framework of theoretical 
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knowledge building in geography. It consists 
in anticipating experience and informing about 
events and phenomena that will occur in the fu-
ture. Forecasts of unwelcome but controllable 
events function as warnings, because human ac-
tion can prevent their detrimental effects. In this 
way forecasts become part of practical studies, 
i.e. ones focusing on effective practical action, 
especially planning. By efficient performance 
of its prognostic function, geography enters the 
field of application research seeking solutions to 
practical problems.
3.3.7. Growing importance of the practical 
function of geographical knowledge
Geography has always supplied knowledge 
that performed practical functions. Suffice it to 
mention the history of geographical discoveries 
and the processes of colonisation. Today, in the 
empirical-scientific model, the practical func-
tion of geographical knowledge refers to those 
of its research problems that involve facilitating 
practical activity. In principle, “practical action 
involves measures taken to produce or sustain 
a specified state of things in some natural or so-
cial system. (...) Practical action is not only one 
seeking to change the material surroundings or to 
transform material objects, but also one intended 
to maintain the existing state of things” (Siemia-
nowski 1976: 51–52). In this approach, practical 
action is a design for the construction of a reten-
tive reservoir and a spatial development plan, or 
the preparation of rules of a territorial reform of 
a country and a study of the geographical envi-
ronment in a given condition.
The implementation of the practical func-
tion takes place via solving problems of the type 
“What to do in order to achieve this and that”. 
Solving practical problems rests on the imple-
mentation of the function of efficiency, i.e. postu-
lates describing optimum states, or states that are 
satisfactory by the given utility criteria and util-
ity values. If this function is to be effective and 
socially comprehensible, it must rest on a type 
of knowledge which gives reasons for and ways 
of steering various factors present in the con-
ceptual framework of geographical knowledge. 
In geographical inquiry, practice-oriented prob-
lems are, for example, those involving designing, 
planning, as well as spatial-economic and envi-
ronmental (ecological) policy at the regional and 
local, and increasingly global, scales.
Geographical studies and knowledge perform 
their practical functions in two ways: indirect and 
direct. In an indirect way, geographical knowl-
edge provides a basis for solving practical prob-
lems when used in a suitable, goal-oriented man-
ner. This can involve: (1) studies of the character 
and possibility of steering of relevant factors and 
processes so as to attain the intended states of 
things; (2) diagnostic studies; (3) supplying infor-
mation necessary for decision-making, especially 
in situations of conflict; (4) formulating warning, 
self-realising and self-destructive forecasts; and 
(5) formulating goal-oriented value judgements 
which can be defined, after Znamierowski (1957: 
13) as follows: “A goal-oriented value judgement 
draws a picture of what our world should be, 
puts some standard before our eyes, (...) thus giv-
ing us a plan of what we are to do. Hence, a goal-
oriented value judgement concerns favourably 
assessed states of things that have not come true 
yet”. The direct role of geographical knowledge 
mainly involves the construction on its basis of 
optimum decision models and projects – plans 
and ways of their implementation.
It should be emphasised that the distinction 
between the cognitive and the practical functions 
of geography is not clear-cut. According to Pary-
sek (2004: 119), “those functions are sometimes 
hard to tell apart sharply, since they intermin-
gle and determine each other”, and “the entire 
geographical knowledge can, and usually does, 
serve practical purposes, whether directly or in-
directly”.
The increase in practical significance derives 
from several factors. First of all, geographical 
knowledge when pursued as an empirical science 
assumes a more exact, general, as well as factu-
ally and theoretically richer character, which re-
inforces its cognitive functions and, in effect, its 
practical functions. This relation is often mutual, 
because solving practical problems requires cog-
nitive knowledge. Another major factor is the ex-
pansion of the subject matter of geography to in-
clude issues of greater social significance, which 
by itself gives them a socially useful, i.e. practical, 
character. The conditions of the development of 
practical functions of geography include, accord-
ing to Parysek (2004: 128), “the appearance of 
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a social demand for geographical knowledge and 
the understanding by decision-makers of both, 
the value of the knowledge and the needs calling 
for its use. However, practical functions prima-
rily require a special effort on the part of geogra-
phers to convince society (...) about the practical 
value of geographical knowledge and the possi-
bility, or even necessity, of its application”.
It should be added that the social utility of ge-
ography, which is among its practical functions, 
also embraces broadly understood geographical 
education (primary, secondary and higher) which 
makes it possible for society to get acquainted 
with a picture of the world seen from a variety of 
perspectives. Thus, its practical function should 
not be identified with the so-called ‘environmen-
tal and social engineering’ only, but also with 
a rebuilding of the social awareness in matters of 
a geographical outlook upon the world.
4. Conclusion
(1) The empirical-scientific model is the most 
efficient basis of development for geography. 
What justifies this thesis is that this model: (a) en-
dows geography with the methodological prop-
erties necessary for it to be treated as an empirical 
science; (b) provides a basis for integrating sci-
entific programmes of geography; (c) seeks the 
unity of geography in its empirical nature; (d) 
places geography in the community of empirical 
sciences; and (e) defines the character of physical 
and socio-economic geography on a basis com-
mon to empirical sciences.
(2) This model is characterised in philosoph-
ical-methodological terms on the broad ground 
of the philosophy of sciences, which provides it 
with foundations while making it unnecessary to 
draw from any individual philosophical orienta-
tions.
(3) The common fundamental methodological 
standards regulating research practice favour the 
type of criticism based on the postulate of clarity 
demanded by the analytical principles of the phi-
losophy of science.
(4) Criticism requires adopting the same atti-
tude towards models resting on different philo-
sophical foundations. This especially concerns 
the humanistic approach, which places geogra-
phy among the humanities rather than empirical 
sciences.
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